Ambrose 3 – The War in Asia

cadillac wwii plane

“Pay off for Pearl Harbor”.  There you go.  The War in Asia.  In 17 easy t read pages!

A few things to note.  Mao Tse-tung=Mao Zedong.  Same guy.  Formosa = Taiwan  Same place.  Remember this from our China unit?

So, what of the colonialism thing?  Why couldn’t Great Britain just chill and let French Indochina be governed by a control council until it reached independence.  That’s what they did in Italy, Germany and Austria.  Ho Chi Minh (future leader of war against America in Vietnam) is here helping us find downed pilots, singing our praises in the war and even copying our declaration of independence.  He even claims they want a representative democracy.  Why couldn’t we all just get along?

In case you hadn’t figured it out yet, the roots of our conflict in Vietnam are right here.  The roots of our conflict in today’s Middle East are right around the corner in our next unit and were even in the earlier unit where the modern middle eastern map was drawn after WWI.

The world you are entering is the way it is because of what has come before.  No student of today’s current events, be they social, political, technical, military or religious, will make any sense of the way things are, without a serious study of the way things were.

Enjoy!

15 thoughts on “Ambrose 3 – The War in Asia

  1. I thought the discussion around the Manhattan Project to be particularly interesting. Ambrose states that, “Many American decisions in WWII- such as allowing the French to reoccupy Indochina- were made quickly and without the benefit of deep analysis because they concerned issues with a relatively low priority” (43). However, the Manhattan Project was discussed in the highest levels of government. This is something that I already knew, but Ambrose then continues with, “the tendency was to regard the bomb as simply another military weapon.” It’s crazy that the government viewed it as just “another military weapon” when it was completely new weapon and they were well aware of the destruction it would cause.

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  2. Even though we just did the Chinese Revolution unit, I was surprised to read about the conditions of the Guomindang soldiers. To read that while elites were living in luxury during the war harshly contrasted how those enlisted lived, many being shoeless, suffering through disease, and 1/3 of them having rifles, often without ammunition. It’s interesting that Chiang put his better soldiers to fight against Mao, the civil war seeming to be more important than WWII, even though there were so many harsh acts that were committed against the Chinese by the Japanese. The “united front” was clearly a facade, and it makes me wonder how things would have played out if Chiang had put more quality soldiers against the Japanese.

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  3. Something that stood out to me in this chapter was the parallels between the ways in which the US handle the division of Korea versus the building of the atomic bomb. It is stated that when establishing the borders of Vietnam, “they concern issues with relatively low priority.” While the design of the atomic bomb was, “thoroughly examined and discussed in the highest levels of the government.” It gives an interesting insight on the priorities of the United States during World War II. I believe that because Japan intentionally attacked the US during Pearl Harbor they’re concerned with defeating Japan was much higher than what was happening in other parts of Europe. This however is speculation and I am interested to see more as to why certain things were prioritized over others.

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  4. I found this chapter a really good driver of Ambrose’s actual voice. His opinions towards Roosevelt/Truman, as well as the related socio-political policies within the war time seem almost sarcastic, especially when he mentions that “American prestige would never be as high again.” (51) One particularly interesting aspect of this section were the cultural implications surrounding the Japanese surrender, as well as the propositioned “American magnanimity” towards the losers of WWII. The culture of Japan was never to surrender without plausible resistance. This appearance of the bomb actually facilitated Japanese surrender, which was interesting. This “surrender” was at the price of millions of lives, and remaining radioactive biochemical effects. Ambrose makes the almost sardonic statement that “lives were cheap” and I couldn’t agree more. The American vengeance towards Pearl. Harbor, but their eagerness to bomb a nation feel very hypocritical. And it doesn’t really help that the two nations became buddy-buddy directly following the war. Finally, I think that on the topic of military-driven foreign policy, America successfully demonstrated its own prowess, and the development of the Manhattan project was more to gain the aforementioned “prestige” rather than create long lasting relationships. I do wonder what would have happened within the Cold War if American-Russian cooperation. had continued flawlessly during this time.

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  5. I felt like this chapter brought up more questions than it answered. Ambrose put a lot of focus on US-China relations, and I distinctly remember his claim that the US funds given to Chiang were known to be bribes to keep China in the Sino-Japanese war. I feel as though this view differs from that of the film we watched in the Chinese Revolution Unit, where it seemed implied that the US was unaware or less aware of the misuse of these funds. Two questions came to mind: How much did the US know about the corruption in the Kuomintang, and did the US support of the Sino-Japanese war ultimately influence the outcome of the Chinese civil war? Also, the nukes have been mentioned a couple times already. But is it possible that in modern warfare, the development of the nuclear bomb has prevented more deaths than it has caused? Morally, it’s clearly reprehensible, and any answer is riddled with counterfactuals. Still, it’d be an interesting question to explore.

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  6. One question I developed from the book came from this paragraph, “America’s Asian policy grew out of military necessity, personality conflict, and political motivation. After retreating from the Philippines in early 1942, the Americans established a base of operations in Australia. They already had one in the Central Pacific on Hawaii. Top Army and Navy officials did not get on well with one another. The result was a division of the area into two theaters of war, the Southwest Pacific and the Central Pacific; the Army under General Douglas MacArthur was responsible for the Southwest Pacific, and the Navy under Admiral Chester Nimitz was in charge in the Central Pacific. MacArthur’s base was Australia; his strategy was to move northward through the N.E.I., the Philippines, and Formosa to get at Japan. Nimitz, in Hawaii, wanted to advance west- ward through the Central Pacific. In the end, both approaches were used.” I wonder, how big of a role did countries and states apart from the US play in succeeding the USA in war. Without Hawaii or Australia, could we have held defenses and attacks long enough to be successful?

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  7. I found the problems that the atomic bombs created amongst the people interesting. Both sides, had different views and opinions on the bombs ,which it was interesting to read about both arguments. It was also interesting reading about why the bombs were dropped in the first place. Some say it was solely based on strategy, but as Ambrose explained some people believed it was so the US could assert their dominance over Russia. In my opinion I believe that the bombs were one of the biggest reasons why the Cold War started.

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  8. I thought the relationship between Stalin and Mao was interesting. Because Stalin’s power was already established, and because Mao’s ideas on how to rise to power in China were so extreme (in Stalin’s eyes), Stalin saw Mao’s desire to take control of China as a threat to his own power, since excessive Communist activity would make the Western democracies hostile. Despite this, Mao still had faith that Stalin would back his position, until the USSR started cooperating with the GMD and Chiang Kai-shek in return for a couple ports and official recognition of control over Outer Mongolia. Then, as Ambrose states, “Mao regarded Stalin as a backstabber.” (42)

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  9. I was really interested in the way that the atomic bomb was treated and the decision to use it came about. First, I thought it was funny how the US was almost begging Stalin to declare war on Japan … until they tested their bomb and were like “we no longer need you, Russia.” Then, Ambrose introduces multiple common perspectives as to why the bomb was used, such as fear of Japan’s armies, the need to impress or scare Russia, and more. However he then says that another possible series of events was that the US realized they had spent two billion dollars on this thing and weren’t gonna let that go to waste — Truman said “I never had any doubt that [the bomb] should be used.” and I think that this disregard for human life is outstanding, given that the bomb’s target was not even anything militaristic, it was aimed at civilian cities.

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  10. I thought that it was interesting reading Ambrose’s opinion regarding the role of America following the Allied Powers win in WWII. “The United States at the end of World War II was universally regarded as the disinterested champion of justice, freedom, and democracy.” (Page 51) This statement caught my eye because, well, I never really thought of it in this sort of context of being “disinterested”, that the United States was not so much involved in the early stages of the war and also didn’t receive very much back at the end, henceforth Ambrose’s idea of “disinterested” being valid in the given context.

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  11. I found it interesting how America sent huge loans to China is the form of direct cash. We hear loans and such being given in the form of materials and such especially during a time of war. It was interesting hearing that they send just wads of cash. But its also interesting how it was basically used as blackmail. I found it silly how Stalin saw Mao as an adventurer and Mao saw Stalin as a backstabber. Im surprised to hear that the atomic bomb was cheaper than mass armies.

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  12. Something I found interesting in the chapter is Mao and Stalin, and how their relationship is talked about. To Stalin, Mao’s ideologies were rather strong, or extreme when it came to his rise to power and governing China. Of course, Stalin felt quite threatened by this fact. However, Mao felt like Stalin would support him, up until his “backstabbing”.

    I also found the bomb discussion interesting. Hearing both sides, opposing and in favor, was very informative and I was able to see both perspectives. From what I have gathered from the chapter, bombs seemed to be a big part of why the Cold War began.

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  13. I find this quote to be hilarious: “Chiang was corrupt, inefficient, and dictatorial, but he was also friendly to the West.” Ambrose basically calls him a bumbling idiot, but America wants him in power because he’s nice to them. This places America in an almost selfish light, acting as if they only care about their gain, and couldn’t care less about how Chiang affects his own country. Politics are funny in this way. By working together or support a certain leader/country, another party seems to suffer in some way. I guess this is why there’s so much conflict at this time.

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  14. I found this whole paragraph to be interesting:
    “There was, in addition, the problem of the Chinese Communists. Chiang was using his only respectable troops against Mao, who in turn
    deployed a force of up to two million men. Full-scale civil war threatened, a war that would be dangerous to the Americans on two counts: It would
    reduce the potential forces that could be thrown against Japan, and it might lead to Chiang’s overthrow and Mao’s victory. The Americans therefore
    tried to force Chiang to bring the Communists into the government and to persuade Mao to cooperate with Chiang. Neither of the Chinese groups,
    however, would make any but the most impossible demands of the other, and nothing was accomplished.”
    The way that a Chinese revolution would have affected America intruiged me, as I hadn’t even thought about the impact before. I wonder what the best and worst outcomes would have been.

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  15. I found the Manhattan Project very interesting. Ambrose believes that it was the singlmost important decision of the war, and he says that it was “the best-kept secret of the war” (44). Apparently, the atomic bomb was initially considered as simply a way to allow aircraft to carry bombs. The U.S. hoped that Russia would enter the war, because they thought that would lead to Japan’s ultimate defeat, even though they had already lost in all other regards. A quote I found interesting was “the Americans expected the Russians to enter the war on August 8, but they dropped the bomb on August 6. When the Japanese did not surrender immediately, they dropped a second bomb on August 9” (47). I wonder, would Russia have been more enclined to enter if not for the bombing? This also means that the U.S. witnessed the full, devastating impact of the atomic bomb, but they nevertheless chose to drop an additional one.

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