Two halves of the same walnut. Truman’s folksy Missouri language comes forward here in his analysis that the Truman Doctrine (containment) and the Marshall plan, the economic aid, were equally necessary in guaranteeing peace in Europe and protecting governments from falling to communist influence. This concern will spread to Asia with the Korean war in 1950 and the middle East with the election of a socialist leader in Iran, part of Southwest Asia of course, but bordering the middle East.
That which Truman was most proud of, that we thoroughly defeated our enemies and then helped them rebuild their economies, is the story here, and it almost didn’t happen.
Opposition for the TD/MP was almost universal in the Republican party with the exception of Senator Vandenberg who tells Truman he must “scare the hell” out of the American people. We know how things went of course but what is interesting is the way things might have gone.
What if communists came to power in Greece and Turkey? What would really change? What if communists were elected in Italy? What if the CIA had never been given authority to conduct covert operations?
Ambrose’s little jibe at Truman being disingenuous and losing sleep over his decision is I think miss-placed. I agree Truman had made up his mind as to what to do, but I think he struggled greatly at figuring out how to get it done. How do you take a people that has been traditionally isolationist, and re-enroll them into an international struggle that could turn as ugly as any preceding World War, or even more so, and convince them to join the fray after four long years of devastating warfare?